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Blessing: The Right to Mental Security

NOTES

THE RIGHT TO MENTAL SECURITY
In 1893, the Supreme Court of Florida declared that the allowance
of compensation for mental distress alone was entirely beyond the
scope of proper judicial activity.1 Fifty years later, the same court
declared that in certain instances there is a constitutional right to such
compensation. 2 The dramatic change in judicial thinking evidenced
by these two statements reflects a similar change in the entire body of
American case law. At one time, few courts allowed compensation
for mental distress alone, or even for physical injuries resulting from
mental distress.8 The law has since changed. To a large extent mental security is now protected by the courts. To the same extent, it
may be said that there exists a legal right to mental security.
It is probable that two factors are primarily responsible for the increased judicial recognition of a right to mental security. The first of
these is the increased amount of knowledge concerning mental processes. Until recent years, little was known of the causes and effects of
mental stress. As the potential for harm inherent in mental stress has
become better understood, the courts have become increasingly willing
to protect mental security.4 The second factor is the increased prevalence of mental distress and mental injury. The common law developed in an era when there were relatively few stress-inducing societal pressures. Today, the demands of society on the human mind are
so complex and so destructive that all of western civilization has been
described as mentally ill and desparately in need of treatment.5 As
mentally induced injuries have become more prevalent, the courts
have become less willing to regard them as extraordinary and unforeseeable occurrences.
This note will outline the modern trend toward increased protection of the right to mental security, consider the reasons underlying
the trend, and indicate how the protection of mental security can be
appropriately limited through the application of standard tort doctrines. Emphasis will be placed on the pertinent Florida decisions.
1. International Ocean Tel. Co. v. Saunders, 82 Fla. 434, 448, 14 So. 148,
152 (1893).
2. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 213, 20 So. 2d 243, 250 (1944).
3. 1 CooLnr, ToRs 90-98 (3d ed. 1906).
4. Winner v. Sharp, 43 So. 2d 634, 637 (Fla. 1949) (dictum).
5. Fn.N, SocIETY As m PATiENT (1950).
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EvoLUTioN IN THE LAW

The Early Rule
It has always been recognized that injuries resulting from an invasion of mental security are compensable if the invasion is the natural
result of an independent tort.( Thus, injury is compensable when it
results from an invasion of mental security caused by a tortiously inflicted physical injury,7 or an independently recognized tort such as
assault 8 or false imprisonment. 9

For a long time most courts were unwilling to go beyond this point.
When a wrongful act not constituting an independent cause of action
resulted in an invasion of mental security alone, or when an invasion
of mental security was the causal link between an act and the resultant injury, compensation was denied. Two early American cases,
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. 10 and Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.1., 1
established this rule. In Mitchell, the female plaintiff was standing on
a crosswalk when a horse-drawn car approached. The car stopped
with the plaintiff between the horses' heads. She became frightened,
lost consciousness, and suffered a miscarriage. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained. Affirming, the appellate court held that there
could be no recovery for negligently caused mental distress alone, or
for injuries resulting from such distress, without immediate personal
injury. The decision was based on a fear of false claims and the supposed unnatural and improbable result of the negligence.
The facts in Spade were quite similar. The negligence of the
defendant caused the female plaintiff to be frightened, and bodily injury resulted. Admitting that emotional distress is a real injury and
that serious physical consequences can ensue, the court nevertheless
reversed a verdict for the plaintiff. Again, the court's decision was
prompted by a fear of false claims and the supposed unfairness to the
defendant. The stated rule was the same as that of Mitchell: the
law does not redress all injuries. Injuries resulting from negligently
induced mental distress are not compensable in the absence of accompanying physical injury. A fortiori, there could be no recovery for
negligently induced mental distress alone.
6. 25 C.J.S. Damages §63 (1941).
7. 25 C.J.S. Damages §65 (1941); 9 FL.&Jur. Damages §88 (1956).
8. 6 C.J.S. Assault & Battery §54 (1937); 3 FLA. Jun. Assault & Battery §26
(1955).
9. 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment §65 (1960); 14 FLA. Jur. False Imprisonment §10 (1957).
10. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
11. 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
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The predicate to compensation for mentally induced injury laid
down in Mitchell and Spade, now known as the "impact" requirement,
was well received by the courts and became the majority rule. At
present, however, only Florida and nine other states' 2 still adhere to
it.As the inequities inherent in the impact requirement became apparent, the courts modified, distinguished, and outrightly rejected it.
Technical Impact
The early decisions dealing with mentally induced injury indicate
much concern over the possibility of false claims. To prevent false
claims, the impact rule was developed. The reasoning underlying the
rule is self-evident. The courts recognized that a serious injury to the
body was likely to cause mental injury. Thus, in most cases, a recovery for the latter element of damages would be proper if preceded
by physical injury. At the same time, the requirement for actual physical injury would preclude a host of false claims. The theory was logically conceived, but defectively applied. Faced with unquestionable
fault, causation, damage, and the impact rule, the courts were soon
finding impact in most innocuous touchings. A typical case is
Zelinsky v.Chimics.18 The plaintiff was "shook up" in a minor automobile accident. He suffered no actual physical injury, but developed
a psychoneurosis, depressive type, as a result of the accident. The
"jolt" of the accident was found to be sufficient impact to allow compensation for the neurosis. Comparable decisions have allowed recovery for mentally induced injuries when there was an inconsequential touching' 4 or insignificant physical injury.15 A recent Florida
12. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v.Cape, 207 Ark. 52, 179 S.W.2d 151 (1944);
Braun v.Craven, 175 I1.401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Kramer v.Eicksmeier, 159
Iowa 48, 139 N.W. 1091 (1913); Morgan v. Hightower's Adm'r, 291 Ky. 58,
163 S.W.2d 21 (1942); Herrick v. Evening Express Publishing Co., 120 Me. 138,
118 Ad. 16 (1921); Sullivan v. H. P. Hood & Sons, 341 Mass. 216, 168 N.E.2d
80 (1960); Gambill v. White, 803 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1957); Greenberg v. Stanley,
51 NJ. Super. 90, 143 A.2d 588 (1958); Bosley v. Andrews, 184 Pa. Super. 396,
135 A.2d 101 (1957). In Florida, there can be no recovery for negligently
induced mental distress or its consequences if the mental distress is unaccompanied
by direct physical impact or trauma. Clark v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Co-op., 107
So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1958); Crane v. Loftin, 70 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1954).
13. 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961).
14. E.g., Arkansas Motor Coaches v. Whitlock, 199 Ark. 820, 136 S.W.2d 184
(1940) (touching of arm); Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581,
144 S.E. 680 (1928) (horse evacuates bowels on lap); Boston v. Chesapeake &
0. fy., 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E.2d 826 (1945) (jolt); Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Roberts, 207 Ky. 310, 269 S.W. 388 (1925) (same); Porter v. Delaware, L. &
W.R.R., 78 N.J. 405, 63 AU. 860 (1906) (dust in eye); Clark Restaurant Co. v.
Rau, 41 Ohio App. 23, 179 N.E. 196 (1931) (ingestion of two tiny particles of
glass).
15. Thompson v. Minnis, 201 Okla. 154, 202 P.2d 981 (1949) (hunger,
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decision'8 indicates that technical impact will be recognized in this
state.
Immediate Injury
The impact rule requires that physical injury and mental stress occur together in order for injuries induced by the mental stress to be
compensable. In a sense, impact and mental stress are required to be
concurrent. Suffering under the inequities of the impact requirement,
some courts soon decided that "concurrent" meant "about the same
time:' Thus, when mental stress was immediately followed by physical impact or injury, damages for injuries caused by the stress could
be recovered. Again, neither the triviality of the impact nor its relative weight in causation was held to be important. Further, it did not
matter that the mental stress had caused the impact Illustrative
of this type of case is Spangberg v. Eastern Air Lines."' The plaintiff
had a ticket for Flight 607, leaving at 7:00 p.m. At 3:00 p.m., the last
call for Flight 607 was erroneously announced. The plaintiff became
startled, upset, and confused. Because of her mental condition, she
fell and suffered injuries as she hurried to the ticket desk. The injuries
received in the fall were considered sufficiently concurrent to provide
the necessary impact. The same reasoning has been used to allow
compensation when mental stress caused an immediate faint and
fall,' 8 immediate injury,' 9 immediate illness,20 and immediate labor
21
pains.
fatigue, and exposure); Toler v. Cassinelli, 129 W. Va. 591, 41 S.E.2d 672
(1946) (physical discomfort).
16. Clark v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Co-op., 107 So. 2d 609 (1958, reversing,
10 Fla. Supp. 174 (1st Cir. Ct. 1957). Negligent maintenance of power lines
caused a violent discharge of electricity into the building of the plaintiff. There
was no direct evidence that the plaintiff had been shocked. As a result of an
emotional disturbance inflicted at the time of the discharge, the plaintiff suffered
from temporary paralysis, nerve dermatitis, and other injuries. The trial court
reluctantly entered a directed verdict for the defendant because of the lack of
evidence of impact. The supreme court reversed, saying that the testimony was
ambiguous and that too much emphasis had been placed on the lack of evidence
of trauma. The court stated: "[An] impact may be administered and not leave
an outward sign." Id. at 612.
17. 285 App. Div. 1002, 188 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1955).
18. E.g., Mitnick v. Whalen Bros. Inc., 115 Conn. 650, 163 Atl. 414 (1932)
(nearness of auto collision causes fear); Conley v. United Drug Co., 218 Mass.
288, 105 N.E. 975 (1914) (explosion and fear); Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co.,
162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y. Supp. 89 (1st Dep't 1914) (peril to children and

fear).
19. Freedman v. Eastern Mass. St. By., 299 Mass. 246, 12 N.E.2d 739 (1938)
(collision and fear).
20. Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 Atl. 343 (1925) (dead mouse in
food and disgust).
21. Townsend v. Seefeld, 102 Kan. 802, 169 Pac. 1157 (1918) (unreasonable
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Since the language of the Florida rule requiring impact is similar
to that of some of the states predicating recovery for mentally induced
injury on immediately subsequent impact,22 it is possible that a recovery might be allowed on this basis in Florida. The question has
never been decided.
Nervous Disorders as Physical Injuries
Unhampered by such technicalities as reality, a few courts in jurisdictions requiring impact have telescoped cause and effect and treated
emotional disturbances as physical injuries in order to create a cause
of action. 23 The same thing has been done to create liability in jurisdictions not requiring impact, but requiring subsequent physical injury.2 4 At first glance, these decisions seem incredibly naive. Properly considered, they represent desirable early attempts to equate
physical injury and mental injury as bodily injuries subject to the same
25
rules of tort liability.
Wanton and Wilful Wrongs
The impact requirement was designed to protect the wrongdoer
from farfetched and fabricated claims. To provide this protection,
the courts intentionally rejected bona fide claims when there was no
preceding impact. Although willing to utilize this approach when the
wrongdoer was guilty of simple negligence, the courts balked at protecting him when the quality of the wrong was more reprehensible.
Thus, the courts unanimously have held that no impact is required to
recover for mentally induced injury when the culpability of the
wrongdoer is great.26 Moreover, when the necessary degree of fault
conduct and shock).
22. Compare Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950) ("connected
with physical injury"), with Block v. Pascucci, 111 Conn. 58, 149 Ad. 210 (1930)
("immediate physical injury") and Conley v. United Drug Co., 218 Mass. 238,
105 N.E. 975 (1914) ("accompanying physical injuries") and Keeny v. Wong
Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 Adt. 343 (1925) ("immediate physical injury") and

Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) ("immediate personal injury").
23. Belt v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 195 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1952) (shock); Watson v. DIlts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N.W. 1068 (1902) (nervous prostration).
24. E.g., DiMare v. Cresci, 23 Cal. 772, 373 P.2d 860 (1962) (schizophrenia); Taylor v. Pole, 16 Cal. 2d 668, 107 P.2d 614 (1940) (hysteria); Cashin
v. Northern Pac. Ry., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 862 (1934) (shock); St. Louis-S.F.
By. v. Clark, 104 Okla. 24, 229 Pac. 779 (1924) (humiliation and mental anguish); Sutton Motor Co. v. Crysel, 289 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)
(neurosis).
25. See subheading "Policy Considerations"infra.
26. Erwin v. Milligan, 188 Ark. 658, 67 S.W.2d 592 (1934) (indecent language and proposals); Valley Dev. Co. v. Weeks, 147 Colo. 591, 864 P.2d 730
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exists, most courts have allowed the recovery of substantial damages
for mental stress alone, even if it did not result in further mental or
physical injury.27 On this basis, recovery for mental suffering alone
has been allowed both in states requiring impact,2 8 and in those not
requiring impact, but requiring subsequent injury in cases of simple
negligence. 29 Several Florida decisions recognize this exception to
the impact requirement. 30
(1961); Boyle v. Chandler, 33 Del. 325, 138 Ad. 273 (1927) (interference with
dead body); Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950) (same); Interstate
Life & Ace. Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599, 193 S.E. 458 (1937) (unreasonable
collection method); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Burton, 104 Ind. App. 576, 12 N.E.2d
360 (1938) (unauthorized autopsy); Holdorf v. Holdorf, 185 Iowa 838, 169 N.W.
737 (1918) (threat); Whitsel v. Watts, 98 Kan. 508, 159 Pac. 401 (1916)
(same); R. B. Tyler Co. v. Kinser, 346 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. 1961) (interference with
grave); Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 150 So. 2d 154 (Miss. 1963) (unreasonable
collection method); Ceers v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 247 S.W.2d 318 (Mo.
App. 1952) (insulting conduct by bus driver); La Salle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934) (unreasonable collection methods);
Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 N.J. 90, 186 Atl. 585 (1936) (interference with dead body); Mitran v. Williamson, 21 Misc. 2d 106, 197 N.Y.S. 2d
689 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (obscenity); Brownlee v. Pratt, 77 Ohio App. 533, 68
N.E.2d 798 (1946) (interference with dead body); Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 189 Okla. 60, 118 P.2d 190 (1941) (second wife sues bigamist); Davidson
v. Lee, 139 S.W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) (threat); Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47
Utah 536, 155 Pac. 429 (1916) (same); Bowles v. May, 159 Va. 419, 166 S.E.
550 (1932) (insult and threat); Christensen v. Swedish Hosp., 59 Wash. 2d 545,
368 P.2d 897 (1962) (threat); Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244
(1924) (assault on plaintiff's elderly father in her presence).
27. Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W.2d 428 (1930) ($100 for mental
suffering); Boyle v. Chandler, 33 Del. 253, 138 AUt. 273 (1927); Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950); American Sur. Co. v. Smallon, 56 Ga. App. 746,
194 S.E. 35 (1937) ($500 for fright); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Burton, 104 Ind.
App. 576, 12 N.E.2d 360 (1938) ($2,500 for mental anguish); Curnett v. Wolf,
244 Iowa 683, 57 N.W.2d 915 (1953) ($4,000 for mental stress); William Small
& Co. v. Lonergan, 81 Kan. 48, 105 Pac. 27 (1909) ($1,000 humiliation); Bt B.
Tyler Co. v. Kinser, 346 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1961) ($3,000 mental suffering); Saenger Theatres Corp. v. Hemdon, 180 Miss. 791, 178 So. 86 (1938) ($1,000 humiliation); Smith v. Aldridge, 356 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. App. 1962) ($1,300 fear); La
Salle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934) ($500
humiliation); Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 189 Okla. 60, 113 P.2d 190 (1941)
($1,000 mental suffering).
28. Wilson v. Wilkins, supra note 27; Kirksey v. Jernigan, supra note 27; Curnett v. Wolf, supra note 27; B. B. Tyler Co. v. Kinser, supra note 27; Smith v.
Aldridge, supra note 27.
29. American Sur. Co. v. Smallon, supra note 27; William Small & Co. v. Lonergan, supra note 27; La Salle Extension 'Univ. v. Fogarty, supra note 27, Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, supra note 27.
30. In Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950), an undertaker took a
dead body without authority and withheld it from the next of kin until an excessive fee was paid. The lower court sustained a demurrer to the complaint because
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The phraseology of the degree of fault necessary to waive the impact requirement varies substantially among the jurisdictions. In general, the language of the various decisions can be broken down into
82
four categories: gross negligence,3 1 wanton and wilful conduct,
83
malicious conduct or conduct implying malice, and intentional
4
acts.
A number of the more recent cases indicate a willingness to accept
less reprehensible conduct to establish the degree of fault necessary to
come within this exception to the impact requirement. Mimimum
7
threats,3 5 merely immoral acts,3 6 and careless construction work
have been held to be sufficient.
Intentional Infliction
The wanton and wilful wrong exception to the impact requirement
must have come as something of a shock to the Restaters, who all
along had been maintaining that mental security, by itself, was not a
protected interest.3 8 Belatedly, they bestirred themselves and created
the following rule: 39
of the lack of impact. The supreme court reversed, saying: "[We do not feel
constrained to extend . . . [the impact] rule to cases founded purely in tort,
where the wrongful act is such as to reasonably imply malice, or where, from the
entire want of care of attention to duty, or great indiffernee to the persons, property, or rights of others, such malice will be imputed as would justify the assessment of exemplary or punitive damages." Id. at 189. Accord, Crane v. Loftin,
70 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1954) (dictum). The allegations of the complaint were insufficient to establish the necessary degree of fault when a train ran into the auto
of plaintiff. International Ocean Tel. Co. v. Saunders, 32 Fla. 434, 14 So. 148
(1893) (dictum). The complaint alleged simple negligence in the delivery of a
telegram.
31. Boyle v. Chandler, 88 Del. 325, 138 Atl. 273 (1927); R. B. Tyler Co. v.
Kinser, 846 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. 1961).
82. E.g., Valley Dev. Co. v. Weeks, 147 Colo. 591, 364 P.2d 730 (1961);
Blakely v. Shortal's Estate, 286 Iowa 787, 20 N.W.2d 28 (1945); Bowles v. May,
159 Va. 419, 166 S.E. 550 (1982).
83. E.g., Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950); Ackerman v. Thompson, 856 Mo. 558, 202 S.W.2d 795 (1947); Laney v. Rush, 152 S.W.2d 491 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941).
34. E.g., Digsby v. Carroll Baking Co., 76 Ga. App. 656, 47 S.E.2d 203
(1948); Cincinnati No. Traction Co. v. Rosnagle, 84 Ohio St. 310, 95 N.E. 884
(1911); Davidson v. Lee, 139 S.W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
85. Curnett v. Wolf, 244 Iowa 688, 57 N.W.2d 915 (1953); Lyons v. Zale
Jewelry Co., 150 So. 2d 154 (Miss. 1963); Christensen v. Swedish Hosp., 59
Wash. 2d 545, 868 P.2d 897 (1962).
36. Mitran v. Williamson, 21 Misc. 2d 106, 197 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
37. R. B. Tyler Co. v. Kinser, 846 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. 1961); Smith v. Aldridge,
356 S.W.2d 582 (Mo. App. 1962).
88. 1 RE-rATEmET, ToRTs §46, comment a (1984).
39. RlESTATMmNT, Tours §46 (Supp. 1948).
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One who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is liable (a) for such emotional distress, and (b) for bodily harm resulting from it.
With the exception of a single case, 40 the Restatement rule did not
reflect the case law at the time it was promulgated, in that:
(1) The vast majority of decided cases required no actual
41
intent.
(2) The opinions that spoke in terms of intent did not require
42
an intent to inflict severe emotional distress.
(8) No case required that severe emotional distress be actually
43
inflicted.
Despite these glaring discrepancies between the law as it was and
the law as it was restated, several jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement rule as their own. Although the rule has enlarged the protection of mental security in some of these jurisdictions, 44 it has caused
others to use language more restrictive than that of their prior decisions.4 5 The Supreme Court of Florida has indicated a willingness to
utilize this doctrine in a proper case.4 6 Although the prestige of the
Restatement will undoubtedly keep this doctrine alive for some time,
it is believed that its future is not overly bright. A rule requiring a
determination of the degree of harm intended to be inflicted and the
degree of distress actually caused is difficult to administer. 47 More40. Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1939).

41. See cases cited notes 81-84 supra.
42. See cases cited note 84 supra.
43. See cases cited notes 81-34 supra.
44. Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 855, 272 P.2d 849 (1954) (no previous decisions); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 830, 240 P.2d 282
(1952) (previously required subsequent injury); Fraser v. Blue Cross Animal
Hosp., 39 Hawaii 371 (1952) (no previous decisions); Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d
73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961) (previously required impact); Cucinotti v. Ortmann,
899 Pa. 26, 159 A.2d 216 (1960) (same); Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 858
P.2d 344 (1961) (no previous decisions).
45. Compare Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 1968), with Ford v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 139 So. 2d 798 (La. App. 1962). Compare
Browning v. Slenderella Sys., 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959), with Christensen v. Swedish Hosp., 59 Wash. 2d 545, 368 P.2d 897 (1962).
46. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958), 13 U. ML'UR L.
BEv. 116 (1958). The court affirmed the dismissal of an action based on §46, finding the alleged language insufficient to constitute a breach of duty under the theory.
While the court specifically refrained from approving §46, the tenor of the opinion
was favorable to it.
47. Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49 A.2d 81, 83 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.
1946) (dictum); Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, 100 So. 2d 396, 398 (Fla. 1958)

(dictum).
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over, as will be indicated later, the artificial restrictions inherent in the
48
rule are neither desirable nor necessary.
Right to Privacy
While some courts were busily engaged in finding exceptions to the
impact rule, other courts took a broader approach. It has always been
held that damages for mental stress are proper when the stress is the
natural result of an independent cause of action. With this principle
in mind, the courts began to design new causes of action aimed at protecting mental security to which damages for mental stress could be
made parasitic. The best known of these, of course, is the action for
invasion of the right to privacy. Inspired by the Warren-Brandeis article,49 this tort, in its original form, was aimed at civil liability for injury
to feelings caused by unreasonable publicity of one's private affairs.
0 the action has been recogNow encompassing four distinct wrongs,
51
states.
nized in at least twenty-seven
Even in its original form this tort constituted a significant protection of mental security. The news and advertising media can and do
unreasonably subject one's personality and personal affairs to the public gaze. Injuries of a mental nature often ensue. The original form
of the tort provided a desirable vehicle for compensating injuries
caused in this manner. Today, however, the action for invasion of the
right to privacy goes far beyond this elementary protection. For example, in Housh v. Peth,52 a bill collector instituted a deliberate and
systematic campaign to harass a school teacher into paying a debt. In
pursuit of this scheme, many phone calls were made to the plaintiff
debtor. Additional calls were made to her employer and landlord. As
a result of these calls, the plaintiff suffered nervousness, worry, humiliation, mental anguish, and loss of sleep. The appellate court approved
48. See subheadings "Policy Considerations"and "Doctrinal Techniques" infra.
49. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HIv.L. REV. 193 (1890).
50. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALw. L. Rv. 383, 389 (1960). Dean Prosser describes these as: "1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs. 2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness.
51. Id. at 386. For recent cases see Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962); Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132
So. 2d 321 (1961); Olan Mills, Inc. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22
(1962); Thompson v. City of Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105 (1st D.C.A. Fla.
1961); Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961);
Britt v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 21 Fla. Supp. 72 (4th Cir. Ct. Fla. 1963);
Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 1963).
52. 99 Ohio App. 485, 135 N.E.2d 440 (1955).
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an award of $2,000, holding that the acts constituted an invasion of her
right to privacy. In the course of the opinion, the court quoted 3 the
widely used A.L.R. definition of the tort:5 4
The unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's
private activities,in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental
suffering, shame or humiliationto a person of ordinarysensibilities.
Many courts have similarly utilized the italicized portion of the rule
to allow recovery in cases dealing with collection efforts, improper
searches, eavesdropping, and invasions of the home. 5 The effect is
startling No publication is required. 6 The wrongful act may be directed to the public activities of the plaintiff.57 Only minimal mental
stress is required,5 8 and the wrongful act need only be negligent.5 9
Together, these cases stand for the proposition that there may be a re53. Id. at 496, 185 N.E.2d at 448.
54. 138 A.L.R. 25 (1942) (Emphasis added.)
55. Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962)
(collection case); Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So. 2d 321
(1961) (same); Thompson v. City of Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105 (1st D.C.A.
Fla. 1961) (negligent breaking and entering); McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939) (listening device in private
hospital room); Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931) (telephone
tap); Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 1963) (collection case); Souder v.
Pendleton Detectives, 88 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 1956) (peeping Tom); Welsh v.
Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952) (invasion of home); Bennett v.
Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959) (improper search); Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 144 W. Va. 673, 110 S.E.2d 716 (1959) (same); Roach v. Harper, 143
W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958) (listening device in rented apartment);
Schultz v. Franlkfort Marine Ace. & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 151 Wis. 537, 139 N.W.
386 (1913) ("rough" shadowing).
56. E.g., McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 55; Rhodes
v. Graham, supra note 55; Souder v. Pendelton Detectives, supra note 55; Welsh
v. Pritchard, supra note 55; Housh v. Peth, supra note 52; Roach v. Harper, supra
note 55.
57. E.g., Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra note 55; Bennett
v. Norban, supra note 55; Sutherland v. Kroger Co., supra note 55; Schultz v.
Frankfort Marine Ace. & Plate Glass Ins. Co., supra note 55.
58. Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra note 55; Norris v.
Moskin Stores, Inc., supra note 55; Thompson v. City of Jacksonville, supra note
55; Welsh v. Pritchard, supra note 55; Bennett v. Norban, supra note 55; Sutherland v. Kroger Co., supra note 55; Roach v. Harper, supranote 55.
59. Thompson v. City of Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
Although this is the only case specifically so holding in a non-publication situation,
it seems clear that an action for invasion of privacy may be based on a negligent
act.
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covery for negligent invasion of the right to mental security resulting
in mental stress alone. Only the name has been changed. It seems
probable that the eminently respectable right to privacy doctrine will
be used to further extend liability in this controversial area of the law.
The Florida courts have recognized an action based on an invasion
of the right to privacy.60 There is some indication that the modem
extension of the doctrine to "non-publicity" situations will be recognized in this jurisdiction. 61
Other Rights
In recent years much attention has been focused on actions for invasion of the right to privacy. Less publicized, but equally important,
are decisions allowing recovery of damages for mental stress alone
occasioned by the invasion of personal rights other than the right to
privacy. Cases in this category recognize the right to peaceful and
60. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1943), second appeal, 159
Fla. 31, 80 So. 2d 635 (1947). In one of her books, Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings
had described an acquaintance as a violent and profane person. The description
was as much admiring as critical, but the described individual brought suit for an
invasion of her right to privacy. An action for damages resulting from an invasion
of the right to privacy was recognized as an independent tort for the first time in
Florida. In the first appeal, the court used this language: "'All courts in this
state shall be open, so that every person for any injury done him in his lands,
goods, person or reputation shall have remedy, by due course of law, and right
and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay'. . . . The word
'person' appearing in ... section 4 of the Bill of Bights should not be confined in
its meaning to the person's physical body alone.... He has thoughts, emotions,
and feelings, as well as physical sensation. So, the word 'person as used in said
section, must be construed to mean the whole man, his personality as well as his
physical body." Id. at 213, 20 So. 2d at 250. Accord, Thompson v. City of Jacksonville, supra note 59; Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1961); Britt v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 21 Fla. Supp. 72 (4th
Cir. Ct. 1963).
61. In Thompson v. City of Jacksonville, supra note 59, the complaint alleged
negligent breaking and entering by police officers without a warrant so as to constitute a negligent invasion of the plaintiff's right to privacy causing mental suffering, humiliation, and embarrassment. The lower court dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action. The First District Court of Appeal reversed without discussion.
In Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 9 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1962),
Florida law controlled. The complaint alleged that a creditor had removed the
tires from a debtor's auto, leaving it on its rims at the debtor's place of employment. The plaintiff suffered mental injury. The lower court dismissed for failure
to state a cause of action. The theory of the case was invasion of the right to privacy. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "publication!'
was required by the Florida decisions, but that "oral communications when accompanied by sufficient publicity is ample in debtor harassment cases." The question
was held to be one for the jury.
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undisturbed enjoyment of the home, 62 the right to enjoy property without unreasonable interference, 63 the right to inter without unreason-

able interference,"4 the right to personal security,6 5 the right to be secure in a reputation for virtue, 66 and civil rights. 67
No Impact Required
Even before the genesis of the impact requirement in the Spade
and Mitchell decisions, an early Texas case, Hill v. Kimball,68 laid the
foundation for a different rule. In Hill, the defendant came upon the
leasehold of the plaintiff and assaulted two negroes. The assault took
place in the immediate presence of the plaintiff, whom the defendant
knew to be well advanced in pregnancy. As a result of defendant's
acts, the plaintiff became frightened, suffered a miscarriage, and was
otherwise impaired in health. Allowing a cause of action on these
facts, the court stated: 69
That a physical personal injury may be produced through a
strong emotion of the mind there can be no doubt. The fact
that it is more difficult to produce such an injury through the
operation of the mind than by direct physical means affords no
sufficient ground for refusing compensation, in an action at law,
when the injury is intentionally or negligently inflicted. It may
be more difficult to prove the connection between the alleged
cause and the injury, but if it be proved, and the injury be the
proximate result of the cause, we cannot say that a recovery
should not be had. Probably an action will not lie when there
is no injury except the suffering of the fright itself, but such is
not the present case. .

.

. Of course, since there is no intent to

62. Wiggins v. Moskins Credit Clothing Store, 137 F. Supp. 764 (E.D.S.C.

1956); Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205
(1916); Engle v. Simmons, 148 Ala. 92, 41 So. 1023 (1906); Watson v. Dilts, 116
Iowa 249, 89 N.W. 1068 (1902); Lesch v. Great No. By., 97 Minn. 503, 106
N.W. 955 (1906); May v. Western Union Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 564, 72 S.E. 1059

(1911).
63. Brillhardt v. Ben Tipp, Inc., 48 Wash. 2d 722, 297 P.2d 232 (1956).
64. Blanchard v. Brawley, 75 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 1954); Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Burton, 104 Ind. App. 576, 12 N.E.2d 360 (1938).
65. Netusil v. Novak, 122 Neb. 749, 241 N.W. 531 (1932); O'Maera v. Russell, 90 Wash. 557, 156 Pac. 550 (1916).
66. Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926); Kurpgeweit v.
Kirby, 88 Neb. 72, 129 N.W. 177 (1910).
67. Marshall v. Sawyer, 801 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962); Antelope v. George,
211 F. Supp. 657 (D. Idaho 1962); Browning v. Slenderella Sys., 54 Wash. 2d
440, 841 P.2d 859 (1959).
68. 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
69. Ibid.
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injure Mrs. Hill alleged, it will be a question for the jury to determine whether his conduct, so far as she was concerned, was
negligent or not; that is to say, whether, under the circumstances, and with the lights before him, a reasonably prudent
man would have anticipated the danger to her or not.
As in Hill,a majority of jurisdictions now allow recovery for injuries
caused by negligently induced fright without requiring previous impact.70 Most courts follow Hill in requiring that the mental stress
result in further mental or physical injury before allowing an action.7 1
70. Kaufman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955); Belt
v. St. Louis-S.F. By., 195 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1952); Penick v. Mirro, 189 F.
Supp. 947 (E.D. Va. 1960); Weston v. National Mfrs. & Stores Corp., 253 Ala.
503, 45 So. 2d 459 (1950); Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440
(1918); Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149 (1959); Usry v.
Small, 103 Ga. App. 144, 118 S.E.2d 719 (1961); Clemm v. Atchison, T. & S.F.
By., 126 Kan. 181, 268 Pac. 103 (1928); Ford v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
139 So. 2d 798 (La. App. 1962); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923
(1951); Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957); Purcell v. St.
Paul City By., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); Kelly v. Lowney & Williams,
Inc., 113 Mont. 385, 126 P.2d 486 (1942); Rasmussen v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232,
280 N.W. 890 (1938); Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H.
329, 150 Ad. 540 (1980); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729
(1961); Sparks v. Tennessee Mineral Prods. Corp., 212 N.C. 211, 198 S.E. 31
(1987); Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App. 442, 140 N.E.2d 822 (1955); Jines v.
City of Norman, 351 P.2d 1048 (Okla. 1960); Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28
R.I. 186, 66 Ad. 202 (1907); Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distrib. Co., 232 S.C.
593, 103 S.E.2d 265 (1958); Memphis St. Ry. v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194
S.W. 902 (1917); Frazee v. Western Dairy Prods., 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037
(1935); Monteleone v. Co-operative Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 840, 36 S.E.2d 475
(1945); Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).
71. Kaufman v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra note 70 (illness); Penick v.
Mirro, supra note 70 (neurosis); Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So.
927 (1912) (physical injury); Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal. App. 2d 581, 92 P.2d 434
(1939) (nervous disorder); Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402
(1941) (physical injury); Hines v. Evans, 25 Ga. App. 829, 105 S.E. 59 (1920)
(insanity); Clemm v. Atchison, T. & S.F. By., supra note 70 (physical injury);
Mahnke v. Moore, =upra note 70 (same); Stewart v. Rudner, supra note 70
(same); Purcell v. St. Paul City By., supra note 70 (miscarriage); Kelly v. Lowney & Williams, Inc., supra note 70 (personal injury); Rasmussen v. Benson, supra

note 70 (heart attack and death); Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors,
supra note 70 (injury to health); Sparks v. Tennessee Mineral Prods. Corp., supra
note 70 (impaired health); Lewis v. Woodland, supra note 70 (broken back);
Jines v. City of Norman, supra note 70 (death); Simone v. Rhode Island Co.,
supra note 70 (nervous disorder); Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distrib. Co.,
supra note 70 (neurodermatitis); Coisher v. Tennessee Elec. Power Co., 19 Tenn.
App. 166, 84 S.W.2d 117 (1935) (nervousness); Frazee v. Western Dairy Prods.,
supra note 70 (miscarriage); Sundquist v. Madison Rys. Co., 197 Wis. 83, 221
N.W. 892 (1928) (hysterical paralysis); Monteleone v. Co-operative Transit Co.,
supra note 70 (physical injury).
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A minority allows recovery for mental stress alone 7 2 and the majority
will allow an action when the resulting injury is minimal. 73
It will be seen that all of the states following Hill fully protect the
right to mental security, even though most of them require that mental
distress result in further injury before allowing a cause of action. It
makes little practical difference whether an action for transitory mental stress is limited to nominal damages or denied altogether. A cause
of action for personal injuries has meaning only as an instrument of
compensation.
It should be noted also that several jurisdictions have rejected the
impact requirement only after considerable experience in administering it.74 Conversely, no jurisdiction has imposed an impact requirement after once having rejected it.
Summary
Twenty-four states now allow an action for the negligent invasion
of mental security resulting in injury.75 Eleven additional states allow
an action for the wanton and wilful invasion of mental security resulting in injury.76 In addition to this general protection, there may be a
recovery for mental stress alone resulting from an invasion of mental
security when:
72. Brown v. Crocker, 139 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 1962) (shock and mental
suffering); Brown v. Broome County, 10 App. Div. 2d 152, 197 N.Y.S.2d 679 (3d
Dep't 1960) (indignation); Lanford v. West Oakwood Cemetery Addition, Inc.,
223 S.C. 350, 75 S.E.2d 865 (1953).
73. E.g., Belt v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 195 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1952) (shock);
Medeiros v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 135 P.2d 676 (Cal. 1943) (stomach upset);
Delta Finance Co. v. Ganakas, 93 Ga. App. 297, 91 S.E.2d 383 (1956) (nervousness); Kujawa v. Baltimore Transit Co., 224 Md. 195, 167 A.2d 96 (1961)
(same); Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926) (mental
shock); Colsher v. Tennessee Elec. Power Co., 19 Tenn. App. 166, 84 S.W.2d 117
(1935) (nervousness); Stafford v. Stewart, 295 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956) (same).
74. Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941), overruling
Israel v. Urich, 114 Conn. 598, 159 Ad. 634 (1932); Stewart v. Rudner, 349
Mich. 459, 85 N.W.2d 816 (1957), overruling by implicationAlexander v. Pacholek, 222 Mich. 157, 192 N.W. 652 (1928); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176
N.E.2d 729 (1961), overruling Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E.
354 (1896); Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App. 442, 140 N.E.2d 322 (1955),
overruling by implication Davis v. Cleveland Ry., 135 Ohio St., 401, 21 N.E.2d
169 (1939).
75. See cases cited note 70 supra.
76. Erwin v. Milligan, supra note 26; Valley Dev. Co. v. Weeks, supra note
26; Boyle v. Chandler, supra note 26; Kirksey v. Jernigan, supra note 26; Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Burton, supra note 26; Holdorf v. Holdorf, supra note 26; Whitsel
v. Watts, supra note 26; Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., sup-ra note 26; Geers v. St.
Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 26; Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra
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(1) The wrongdoer is simply negligent (three states). 77
(2) The fault of the wrongdoer is extreme (twelve states).78
(3) The mental stress can be made parasitic to a modem cause
of action protecting mental security, as an invasion of the right to
privacy (twenty-seven states)
(4) The mental stress can be made parasitic to an established
independent cause of action, as wrongfully inflicted physical injury
(all states). s° The independent action need only technically exist
(fourteen states).81
.9

The right to mental security has thus been accorded a substantial degree of protection by the courts. The degree of protection is steadily
increasing. This is as it should be.
POLICY CONSMIERATIONS

The Reality of MentaZ Injury
The courts of civil jurisdiction exist to redress injury. When an
injury occurs through the wrongdoing of another person, the injured
party should be able to obtain compensation in the courts unless there
are compelling policy considerations precluding such compensation.
It can no longer be doubted that mentally induced injuries are as
real and as damaging as those physically induced-legally, medically,
and economically. The late Justice Terrell described the possible ef82
fects of mental stress and commented on their reality in these words:
Psychosomatic illness of a serious nature may follow. The emotions may be unstrung, the nerves put on edge, and the end effect may be a period in a rest home [or] a mental hospital, serious physical derangement, and sometimes death. Damage for
mental pain and suffering is one of the late developments in the
law and its potentialities are not restricted as they formerly
were because so much has been learned of the evil consequences
that flow from mental injury.
Every jurisdiction has recognized the reality of injuries induced
through the invasion of mental security. It is true that many jurisdictions arbitrarily deny compensation for such injuries in certain situanote 26; Jeppsen v. Jensen, supranote 26.
77. See cases cited note 72 supra.
78. See cases cited note 27 supra.
79. Presser, Privacy, 48 CALw. L. BEv. 883, 886 (1960).
80. 25 C.J.S. Damages §65 (1941).
81. See cases cited notes 13-21 supra.
82. Winner v. Sharp, 43 So. 2d 634, 637 (Fla. 1949).
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tions. However, even "impact" states have allowed recovery for severe mental stress, 8 3 psychosomatic illness,8 4 neurosis, 85 psychosis, 8 6
and death 7 induced by mental stress when the facts of a case brought
it within a doctrine allowing recovery.
The legal recognition of mentally induced injury is supported by
medical knowledge. When an invasion of mental security results in
psychic stress, as it must, the brain responds.88 An unpleasant emotional sensation occurs, adrenalin is released into the bloodstream, and
metabolic, respiratory, and heart rates quicken.8 9 If the stress is prolonged, cortisone is secreted, and all of the body's resources are mobilized for defense.00 These reactions occur regardless of their utility.9 1
It is not suggested that the psychosomatic state caused by mental stress
should be a legally compensable injury if merely transitory, but a different conclusion follows if it is prolonged. The mind is distracted
and suffers emotional pain. The body is disfunctionally oriented. An
impairment of bodily well-being and function for any appreciable time
must be considered an injury.
Much greater injury can occur when mental stress is of such intensity or duration as to render ineffective the normal mechanisms of adjustment. Serious mental and physical injury can result.92 The most
common yet most dramatic result is actual physical injury.93 Among
the physical injuries that can be predominantly caused by mental stress
alone are: asthma, allergic conditions, coronary artery disease, gastritis, peptic ulcer, gallstones, colitis, proctitis, constipation, frigidity,
menstrual irregularities, insomnia, faintness, epilepsy, stroke, migraine
headaches, and muscle stiffness. 94 Excessive mental stress can also
result in neurotic95 and psychotic9 6 conditions, and even death.97
83. Carter v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 47 N.J. Super. 379, 136 A.2d

15 (1957).

84. Menaker v. Supplee-Wils-Jones Milk Co., 125 Pa. Super. 76, 189 At. 714
(1937).

85. Kraus v. Osteen, 135 So. 2d 885 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
86. Osgood v. D. W. Winkelman Co., 274 App. Div. 694, 87 N.Y.S.2d 110 (3d
Dep't 1949).
87. Cauverien v. De Metz, 20 Misc. 2d 144, 188 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
88. 3 LAwYms" MEDIcAL CYCLopEmD.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

§19.8 (1959).

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Id. §19.1.
I. §19.2.
Id. §19.10.

95. GREGony, PsYcmTRIY 236 (1961).

96. Ibid.
97. 3 LAwYERs MEDICA. CYCLOPEDIA §19.1 (1959).
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Finally, to put it in terms of dollars and cents, mentally induced
injury can result in substantial economic loss. The individual who has
sustained such an injury is just as incapacitated and in need of treatment as one injured through purely physical causation. 98 For example, over one half of the hospital beds in this country are occupied by
mental patients.9 9 The annual expenditure for the care and maintenance of mental patients in public hospitals alone exceeds one billion
dollars.10 0 It is estimated that the annual loss of earnings of these
same individuals also is in excess of one billion dollars. 10 To be sure,
not many cases of mental illness result from legally actionable causes.
The point is-mentally induced injury can and does cause the injured
party substantial sums of money.
It is clear then, that mentally induced injury is damaging in the
legal sense, in the medical sense, and in the economic sense. Only
compelling considerations of policy would justify insulating a wrongdoer from civil liability for such injuries. Yet, an examination of the
policy arguments upon which insulation is predicated will demonstrate
that they are not convincing objections to liability.
False Claims
From the earliest cases to the most recent ones l1a the principal
reason given for arbitrary barriers to recovery for mentally induced
injuries has been a fear of false claims. Many courts have refuted the
validity of this argument; for example: 10 4
10

2

Are our courts so naive, are they so gullible, are they so devoid
of worldly knowledge, are they so childlike in their approach to
realities that they can be deceived and hoodwinked by claims
that have no factual, medical, or legalistic basis? If they are,
then all our proud boasts of the worthiness of our judicial system
are empty and vapid indeed.
Under our system of justice, it is
to differentiate between fraudulant
cannot do so, the system should be
remains as it is, it is the duty of the

a principal function of the courts
and valid claims. If the courts
changed. So long as the system
courts to recognize injuries under

98. Id. §19.8.
99. PEASON, STme's FuNDAimNrALs or PsYcHATRY 1 (6th ed. 1963).
100. Id. at 5.
101. Ibid.
102. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
103. Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
104. Id. at 175, 142 A.2d at 270 (dissent).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1964

17

NOTES
Florida Law
Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [1964], Art. 3

rejecting those claims which fail to
appropriate standards of proof,
10 5
measure up to the standards.
Suppose a court does require that an arbitrary formula be met
before allowing recovery for mentally induced injuries? Does a slight
jar guarantee the reality of a resultant neurosis? Does a slight burn?
Certainly notl Yet recovery for resultant neuroses has been predicated on these minor injuries in states requiring impact.10 6 Arbitrary
rules cause arbitrary results. They guarantee nothing.10 7
Finally, it must be recognized that in many cases there is no guarantee of reality when a purely physical injury resulting from purely
physical trauma is alleged. Yet the courts have never suggested that
all such claims be rejected because of the possibility that some might
be false. The courts should accordingly be willing to separate the false
claim from the valid one without regard to the nature of the injury or
the manner in which it was inflicted.
Measurement of Damages
A second problem that has perplexed the judicial mind concerns
the measurement of damages. In fact, the imagined impossibility of
measuring mental injury in terms of dollars was the basis of the earliest
Florida decision requiring impact as a predicate to recovery for mental
injury. In International Ocean Tel. Co. v. Saunders, 0 8 the Supreme
Court of Florida was faced with a case wherein it was alleged that the
negligent delivery of a death message resulted in substantial mental
anguish to the plaintiff. Reversing an award to the plaintiff, the court
stated:109
The resultant injury [mental anguish] is one that soars so exclusively within the realms of spirit land that it is beyond the
reach of the courts to deal with, or to compensate by any of the
known standards of value. It presents a class of cases where
legislative action fixing some standard of recovery would be
highly appropriate; but, until this action is taken, we do not feel
that the courts are authorized to so widely diverge from the cir105. Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 AtI.
540 (1930); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961); Ferrara v.
Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249 (1958); Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d
289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961).
106. Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285,
23 S.W.2d 272 (1929); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351
(1961).
107. Green v. T. A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 75, 73 At. 688, 692 (1909)

(dictum).
108. 32 Fla. 434, 14 So. 148 (1893).
109. Id. at 447, 14 So. at 152. (Emphasis added.)
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cumscribed limits of judicial action as to undertake to mete out
compensation in money for the spiritually intangible.
Pursuant to this suggestion, the legislature did take action. In 1913,
a statute created civil liability for the negligent transmittal or delivery
of a telegram."10 But, mental anguish was made an element of damages,"" and the trier of fact was left to determine the amount of the
award 1" 2 Not in the least nonplussed, the Florida courts began
doing what they had said could not be done-measuring mental injury
in term of dollars. 113 Under a similar statute, the courts of Florida
have determined the dollar amount of mental pain and suffering occasioned by the death of a minor child."14 Moreover, it must be
remembered that Florida courts can and constantly do measure mental injury precipitated by physical injury.
It is of course difficult to measure the dollar amount of certain
types of mental injury, but this is equally true with certain types of
physical injury. The difficulty has not prevented it from being done.
The determination can and should be left to the good sense, sound
judgment, and enlightened conscience of the jury under appropriate
judicial supervision."i 5
The Flood of Litigation
A third argument advanced in opposition to an extension of the
judicial protection of mental security is the old standby-fear of a flood
of litigation. Litigation, however, costs a great deal of money. So
long as damage awards for this type of injury are limited to reasonable
amounts, litigation will be minimized." 06 There is no evidence that
liberal rules of compensation for mentally induced injury cause an increased amount of litigation. If an increase does occur, it is not reflected in the reported appellate cases. Prior to 1961, Louisiana
(requiring neither impact nor subsequent injury) had approximately
42 reported appellate cases in this area. 1 7 Texas (not requiring im110. Fi A. STAT. §363.02 (1963).
STAT.

§363.06 (1963).

FLA. STAT.

§363.07 (1963).

111. FL.

112.

113. Western Union TeL Co. v. Bedding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743 (1930)

($1,000).
114. FLA.

STAT.

§768.03 (1963), Winner v. Sharp, 43 So.

2d 634 (Fla. 1949)

($5,500).
115. Erie R.R. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77 (1920); Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas Co.,
158 Cal. 499, 111 Pac. 534 (1910); Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Wright, 246 Ky.
208, 54 S.W.2d 666 (1932); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Nolton, 58 Nev. 133, 71
P.2d 1051 (1937).
116. DeLoach v. Lanier, 125 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Fla. 1954).
117. The figures in this paragraph are based on the writer's accumulation of
cases in non-selective research.
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pact, but requiring subsequent injury) had approximately 39. New
York (requiring impact) had approximately 42. One writer has gone
so far as to say that the volume of litigation has been heaviest in states
18
following the impact doctrine.'
Finally, even if liberal rules of recovery in this area do create more
litigation, the price is not too high. When wrongful acts cause serious
injury, there should be adequate forums to adjudge compensation. If
the courts become overcrowded, the proper remedy is an increase in
their number, not a decrease in the availability of justice.
Lack of Precedent
Many courts have been troubled by the lack of precedent upon
which liability could be predicated. The earlier Florida decisions declined to extend liability in this area because of the lack of precedent"19 and the lack of legislative sanction. 120 The later cases simply
apply the doctrine of stare decisis.121 None of these considerations
should be a bar to the institution of a more desirable rule in light of
the modem Florida approach to precedent. In Cason v. Baskin, 2 2
the Supreme Court of Florida for the first time recognized an invasion
of the right to privacy as an independent tort. In that opinion, the
court spoke of "judge-made" law and stated: "[T]he courts in carrying out their strictly judicial duties have always had an important part
in what might be called the law-making process .... So the common
law has been and still is a living and growing thing." 2 3 The lack of
precedent should be no bar to the institution of a more desirable rule.
The same may be said for the existing precedents setting arbitrary
limits on recovery for mentally induced injury. In Hargrove v. Town
of Cocoa Beach, 24 the Supreme Court of Florida repudiated the
anachronistic rule insulating municipal corporations from tort liability,
stating:' 25
We can see no necessity for insisting on legislative action in a
matter which the courts themselves originated ....
[W]e
must recognize that the law is not static. The great body of our
118.
(1961).
119.
(1893).
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Lambert, Tort Liability for Psychic Injuries, 41 B.U.L. REv. 584, 592
International Ocean Tel. Co. v. Saunders, 32 Fla. 434, 14 So. 148
Dunahoo v. Bess, 146 Fla. 182, 200 So. 541 (1941).
Crane v. Loftin, 70 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1954).
155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944).
Id. at 214-15, 20 So. 2d at 251.
96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
Id. at 132-33.
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laws is the product of progressive thinking which attunes traditional concepts to the needs and demands of changing times.
Judicial consistency loses its virtue when it is degraded
by the vice of injustice.
Neither the lack of precedent nor the existence of precedenft should
make possible the perpetuation of an unjust rule.
This discussion began with the proposition that every wrongfully
inflicted injury should be redressed in the absence of cogent and
compelling policy considerations dictating a contrary result. The invasion of mental security can and does result in substantial injury.
The policy considerations which have been advanced to justify the
denial of compensation for injuries caused by an invasion of mental
security are not convincing, thus such injuries should be compensated.
There should be a right to mental security.
DocrnuAn LnTATONS

Recognition of a legally protected right to mental security does not
require that the courts entertain and compensate all such claims without limitation. Both claims and awards for mentally induced injury
can be appropriately limited on a case-by-case basis through the judicial application of standard tort doctrines. Since all of the opinions
allowing recovery for the intentional infliction of mental injury require both an unreasonable act and subsequent injury,126 it is not
necessary to consider the doctrines relating to an invasion of the right
to mental security as an intentional tort. The entire area can be
treated within the classical divisions of negligence-duty, causation,
and damages.
Duty
Regardless of the theory on which liability for mentally induced injury is predicated, there must be an unreasonable invasion of the plaintiff's right to mental security. This requirement can and has been
used to appropriately limit liability.
First, the act of the defendant must be such, under the circumstances, as to create mental stress in a person of ordinary sensitivity.
Otherwise, the defendant has breached no duty owing to the plaintiff.
As a Florida court said recently in relation to the right of privacy:
"The standard by which the right is measured is based upon a concept
of the man of reasonable sensibility; the hypersensitive individual will
not be protected." 27 All of the courts that have considered the ques126. See cases cited notes 34, 44-45 supra.
127. Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715, 718 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1961).
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tion have denied a cause of action when the act complained of was
considered insufficient to create mental stress in a person of normal
sensibilities.128 The same result has been reached when the act complained of was otherwise not unreasonable as between the parties.' 29
The rights of the plaintiff must be balanced against the rights of others.
Furthermore, if a defendant is to be held liable, his conduct must
constitute a legal breach of a duty owing to the plaintiff. In an individual case, policy considerations may preclude recovery. The concept of legal duty in relation to mentally induced injury has been most
carefully considered in cases factually similar to the Palsgraf case.' 3 0
The recent case of Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.' 31 clearly
outlines the application of the concept. A truck negligently ran over a
female infant while her mother watched. The mother sued for resultant nervous shock and consequent physical injury. In denying recovery, the majority opinion held that the issue was one of duty, to be
initially determined by the court. Duty, declared the opinion, is a set
of facts upon which liability may be predicated. The court weighed
the plaintiff's right to freedom from invasion of bodily security against
such policy considerations as the need to limit liability, the potential
burden on users of the highway, and the degree of the defendant's
fault. Three justices dissented.' 3 2 Advocating a case-by-case approach, the minority argued that although this type of action does
need to be limited, the fact of infancy and the parental and spatial
relationships provided sufficient limitation. The great bulk of the
courts which have considered this question agree with the majority
in Amaya that an action for mentally induced injuries cannot be

128. E.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. McKenzie, 96 Ark. 218, 131 S.W. 684
(1910) (imaginary fear); Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34
(Fla. 1955) (picture on television); Anderson v. Atlanta Newspapers, 212 Ga.
776, 95 S.E.2d 847 (1956) (newspaper ad); Bucknam v. Great No. Ry., 76 Minn.
373, 79 N.W. 98 (1899) (insults); Langworthy v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 368
S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1963) (libel).
129. Tollefson v. Safeway Stores, 142 Colo. 442, 351 P.2d 274 (1960) (collection case); Couldman-Taber Pontiac v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881
(1957) (same); Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 858, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948)
(same); Givens v. Town of Ruston, 55 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 1951) (destruction
of property in emergency); Kraus v. Spielberg, 37 Misc. 2d 519, 236 N.Y.S.2d 143
(Sup. Ct. 1962) (warning by physician); Lewis v. Physicians & Dentists Credit
Bureau, 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947) (collection case).
130. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
131. 29 Cal. 83, 379 P.2d 513 (1963).
132. Id. at 45, 379 P.2d at 525.
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predicated on a wrongful act directed toward one other than the
34
plaintiff.' 3 A few decisions hold to the contrary.'
Another important policy consideration limiting liability is the
potential effect of liabilty on societal relationships. For example, in
Zepeda v. Zepeda,135 an illegitimate child sued his father, alleging
mental injuries resulting from the child's status as an adulterine bastard. In a brilliant opinion, the court found all the elements of an
actionable tort, but dismissed the action. The impact of liability,
said the court, would be so far-reaching as to make judicial recognition of it improper.
In denying liability for mentally induced injuries because there
was no breach of a legal duty, other courts have considered such
factors as the effect on news coverage,13 6 the effect on the doctorpatient relationship,1 3 7 the effect on judicial proceedings,1 38 the needs
of business, 3 9 the burden of liability on users of the highway,140 the
degree of fault of the defendant,14 ' and the purpose of the defend142
ant.
The Amaya and Zepeda decisions, and others like them, indicate
that many factors can and should be considered in determining
whether an act causing mentally induced injury constitutes a breach
of a legal duty owing to the plaintiff.14 When policy factors outweigh the desirability of redressing injury, recovery should be denied.
133. E.g., Angst v. Great No. By., 131 F. Supp. 156 (D. Minn. 1955) (peril
to another); Hunt v. Calacino, 114 F. Supp. 254 (D.D.C. 1953) (threat to son);
Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80 (1957) (injury to another);
Lessard v. Tarca, 20 Conn. Supp. 295, 133 A.2d 625 (1957) (same); Hayward v.
Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952) (same); Honeycutt v. American Gen.
Ins. Co., 126 So. 2d 789 (La. App. 1960) (same); Kalina v. General Hosp., 31
Misc. 2d 18, 220 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (unlawful circumcision of son);
Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960) (injury to another);
Venske v. Johnson-Lieber Co., 47 Wash. 2d 511, 288 P.2d 249 (1955) (same).
134. Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912) (peril to children); Kujawa v. Baltimore Transit Co., 224 Md. 195, 167 A.2d 96 (1961) (injury to son); Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y.S. 39 (1st
Dep't 1914) (peril to children); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Coopwood, 96 S.W. 102
(Tex. Civ. App. 1906) (mistreatment of ill daughter); Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah
536, 155 Pac. 429 (1916) (threat to husband).
135. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
136. Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
137. Kraus v. Spielberg, 37 Misc. 2d 519, 236 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
138. Gore v. Condon, 87 Md. 368, 39 Ad. 1042 (1898).
139. Grimm v. Barn, 22 Misc. 2d 982, 195 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
140. Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950).
141. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
142. Givens v. Town of Ruston, 55 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 1951); Phillips v.
Cordes Towing Serv., 50 Wash. 2d 545, 313 P.2d 377 (1957).
143. Puossun, ToRvs 123 (2d ed. 1955).
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When policy considerations are not so compelling, recovery should
be allowed. The type of injury alone is seldom the key.
Causation
The determination of legal causation in mental injury cases raises
difficult problems. It is not surprising that this is so. A mental
factor in cause or effect can seldom be traced to a single "cause."
One authority has isolated six different factors that can be significant
in causing a person to be predisposed toward contracting a mental
disease.' 4 4 These are heredity, sex, occupation, generation, environment, and a history of previous mental disease. Similarly, eight
factors that can be significant in exciting mental disease have been
isolated.1'" These are enervating physical conditions, intoxication,
metabolic imbalances, chronic toxicity, chronic cerebral and gross nervous diseases, trauma, sunstroke, and life situations resulting in anxiety.
Furthermore, it must be realized that any number of these factors of
causation may be present in an individual case. For example,146 a
twenty-one-year old girl developed a psychosis. The following factors
were deemed to be among those causing the condition: a difficult birth,
a head trauma at age four, a mental trauma at age ten (indecent exposure), mental stress at age twelve (unprepared for onset of menstruation), a broken wrist and resulting physical deformity at age fifteen, an
unhappy love affair at age nineteen, and her father's favoritism toward
an older sister over the years. One mental condition resulted from
seven independent "causes" over a twenty-year period. The difficulty
of determining if and where legal causation should be found in a situation such as this is apparent. Fortunately, the difficulty can be minimized by the application of traditional tort doctrines concerning causation.
First, and most important, factual causation between the act of the
defendant and the alleged injury must be established by satisfactory
evidence. When the appropriate standard of proof is not met, the
courts should and have dismissed the claim.147 As a Florida court
stated: 'It should appear from the evidence with reasonable certainty
144. Pr.nsoN, STHECKER'S FNDAmEntA.Ls oF PsYCHIATRY 15 (6th ed. 1963).

145. Id. at 21.
146. Id. at 28.
147. E.g., Wilson v. Northland Greyhound Lines, 166 F. Supp. 667 (D. Mont
1958); Atlantic Coast Line By. v. Brash, 73 Fla. 478, 74 So. 2d 503 (1917); Davis
v. Murray, 29 Ga. App. 120, 113 S.E. 827 (1922); Wilhelm v. State Traffic Safety
Comm'n, 230 Md. 91, 185 A.2d 715 (1962); Hoffman v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.,
255 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. 1953); Jines v. City of Norman, 351 P.2d 1048 (Okla.
1960).
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that the diseased condition [neurasthenia] of the [plaintiff] resulted
4
from the injuries received by him in the . . . accident... "1 8
Once it is established that an act is the factual cause of a mentally
induced injury, there remains the problem of determining whether it
is the legal cause. Although legal causation is determined principally
by balancing policy considerations,' 4 9 it may generally be stated that
a torifeasor is liable only for the natural and probable results of his
wrongdoing. 150 When a result may be typified as extraordinary, there
is no liability.""' On this basis, compensation has been refused when
a nearby collision caused fright, heart trouble, and death in a bystander. 152 Other cases have reached a similar result when the consequences of the wrongdoing were so unusual as to make it unfair to
hold the defendant liable.'153 Liability has also been denied when
the alleged mental injury was so uncertain and speculative as to render
it an improper basis for compensation. 154 The factors considered in
limiting legal causation are generally the same as those considered in
limiting legal duty, but the emphasis is shifted from cause to effect.
Another limitation on legal causation, the doctrine of independent
intervening forces, is represented by the Florida case of Britt v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.15 5 In Britt, a telephone direc148. Atlantic Coast Line By. v. Brash, 73 Fla. 478, 481, 74 So. 503, 504
(1917).
149. PRossER, ToRTs 252 (2d ed. 1955).

150. Cone v. Inter County Tel. & Tel. Co., 40 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1949); PaNossln, TonTs 255 (2d ed. 1955).
151. bid.
152. Angst v. Great No. By., 131 F. Supp. 156 (D. Minn. 1955); State v.

Baltimore Transit Co., 197 Mo. App. 528, 80 A.2d 13 (1951).
153. E.g., Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 52 S.E. 152 (1905)
(fear of consequences of inconsequential injury); McCullough v. Orcutt, 14 InI.

App. 2d 503, 145 N.E.2d 109 (1957) (injury to husband causes miscarriage by
wife); Manning v. Spees, 216 Iowa 670, 246 N.W. 603 (1933) (assault on wife
causes physical injury to husband); Dahlem v. Hackley Union Nat'l Bank & Trust

Co., 361 Mich. 609, 106 N.W.2d 121 (1960) (broken hip causes anxiety over legal settlement); Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960)
(fear for another causes neurosis); Wedgworth v. City of Fort Worth, 189 S.W.2d
40 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) (covert threats cause loss of memory and inability to

concentrate); Shaw v. Browning, 59 Wash. 2d 133, 367 P.2d 17 (1961) (leg injury causes mental suffering because of helpless condition when house burns down
months later).
154. E.g., City of Columbus v. Strassner, 124 Ind. 482, 25 N.E. 65 (1890)
(lack of personal enjoyment); Root v. Des Moines City By., 113 Iowa 675, 83
N.W. 904 (1900) (inconvenience); O'Conner v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins.

Co., 2 So. 2d 234 (La. App. 1941) (disappointment over cancelled vacation);
Morris v. St. Paul City By., 105 Minn. 276, 117 N.W. 500 (1908) (suffering attendant to hypothetical childbirth).
155. 21 Fla. Supp. 72 (4th Cir. Ct. 1963).
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tory erroneously listed the street address of the plaintiff as that of a
second party. Unknown persons came to call on the second party at
all hours of the night, causing the plaintiff mental anguish. In an action for invasion of the right to privacy, the court entered a summary
judgment for the defendant. The acts of the unknown persons were
held to be an independent intervening force insulating the defendant
from liability for the resultant mental anguish.
It is thus apparent that normal tort doctrines concerning causation
can be used to limit recovery for mentally induced injury. Consequently there is no need for an arbitrary rule against recovery in every
case where there is a mental link in causation.
It is appropriate here to mention several additional problems of
causation that have been considered by the courts. When a person is
born, he inherits a certain degree of tolerance to mental stress and
mental injury.' 5 6 The degree of tolerance varies throughout the person's life as he is moulded by his experiences. 15 7 As a result of low or
impaired tolerance, quite serious mental disorders can result from relatively minor trauma. A California case, DiMare v. Cresci,15 8 illustrates this possibility. The plaintiff was a latent schizophrenic. Due
to the negligence of the defendant landlord, a staircase collapsed and
the plaintiff fell through it to his waist, suffering minor injuries to his
hip and leg. Because of his prior mental conditon, the fall had special
meaning to the plaintiff. It resulted in severe emotional shock, delusions, a serious mental disorder, and extensive hospitalization. Affirming an award of $100,000 to the plaintiff, the court held that the prior
condition was a pre-existing physical condition which did not limit the
liability of the defendant. Several courts have taken the same position in relation to pre-existing mental conditions. 59 However, it has
been pointed out that the award in such a case should be limited to
156. PEArSON, STEcKE:'s FUNDA mNTALs oF PsYcmmmIY 28 (6th ed. 1963).

157. Ibid.
158. 28 Cal. 772, 373 P.2d 860 (1962).
159. Feeley v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (prior neurosis); Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal. App. 2d 628, 286 P.2d 474 (1955) (prior nervous condition); Flood v. Smith, 126 Conn. 644, 13 A.2d 677 (1940) (same); Le
Jeune v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 105 So. 2d 327 (La. 1958) (prior neurosis); Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 Ad. 343 (1925) (unusual fear of
mice). Compare McMahon v. Bergeson, 9 Wis. 2d 256, 101 N.W.2d 63 (1960),
wherein the plaintiff had a functionally repressed neurosis. In an auto accident
caused by the negligence of the defendant, he suffered a concussion, weakening
his powers of repression. While in this weakened condition, he saw the defendant
lying injured and the defendant's wife standing nearby. They resembled his parents, about whom he had unresolved emotional problems. The sight triggered a
full-blown functional neurosis, anxiety type. The court reversed an award for the
plaintiff, ignoring the concussion, and finding that the sight of the defendants
caused the neurosis. The result seems appropriate. The reasoning does not.
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compensation for the increased degree of mental impairment. 160 It
has also been suggested that whenever a minor trauma results in a serious mental disorder, the injury should be treated as resulting from the
aggravation of a pre-existing
condition.161 The award should be lim1 2
ited accordingly.

Difficult problems have also arisen when a mental disorder results
from more than one cause, and the defendant is liable for less than all
of them. In Greenberg v. Stanley,16 3 the plaintiff was pushing her
infant child in a carriage on the sidewalk. The defendant lost control
of his car and struck them. The plaintiff was severely injured. The
child was killed. As a result of her physical injuries and the loss of her
child, the plaintiff developed a disabling neurosis. Although mental
injury caused by the death of the child was not compensable under the
law of the forum, the court affirmed an award of $27,500 to the plaintiff. The opinion reasoned that the resulting neurosis could not be
separated as to cause. Therefore, the defendant was held liable for
the entire injury. Other courts have used the same reasoning to allow
recovery in cases of multiple causation.8 4 Pennsylvania allows recovery when a legal wrong is the primary cause of a mental injury, 0 5 but
not when the wrong is merely a secondary cause.'36
Damages
The greatest potential for judicial control of mental injury litigation
lies in the courts' power to disallow and limit awards. Under proper
circumstances, an adequate award for mentally induced injury is desirable. But, the fact of injury must be established by competent
proof, and the amount of the award must be reasonable.
As so many courts have pointed out, mentally induced injury is
capable of simulation. The same may be said of many physically induced injuries. With both types of injury, false claims may be pre160. Feeley v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
161. Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 VA. L. BEv. 87, 120
(1943).
162. Ibid.
163. 51 N.J. Super. 90, 143 A.2d 588 (App. Div. 1958).
164. Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 AtI. 182 (1933) (personal fear
and fear for others); Smith v. Aldridge, 356 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. App. 1962)
(same); Danner v. Arnsberg, 227 Ore. 420, 362 P.2d 758 (1961) (physical trauma
and fear). In Industrial Fin. Serv. Co. v. Riley, 295 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956), fifteen loan companies were held to have joint and several liability for an
individual nervous condition resulting from the aggregate of their independent
unreasonable collection efforts.
165. Menaker v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 125 Pa. Super. 76, 189 Ad.
714 (1937).
166. Koplin v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 322 Pa. 333, 185 At. 744 (1936).
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vented by requiring appropriate standards of proof before allowing
recovery. In some cases, expert testimony will be required. 167 In
others, the circumstances of the case will permit lay testimony regarding the fact of mentally induced injury.1 68 In either event, the
absence of adequate proof of mentally induced injury should result in
a directed verdict for the defendant or an award of only nominal
damages. Many courts have utilized this doctrine to deny recovery
for mentally induced injury when the evidence was insufficient to establish the reality of the injury.' 6 9 Juries have applied the doctrine
when the facts were in dispute. 70 Even though the evidence is adequate to establish the fact of mental injury, the award may be excessive. When an award is excessive, the doctrine of remittitur can,
should, and has been applied to reduce awards for mental injury.171
167. Atlantic Coast Line By. v. Brash, 73 Fla. 478, 74 So. 503 (1917) (expert
testimony required as to extent and duration of neurosis).
168. Fehely v. Senders, 170 Ore. 457, 135 P.2d 283 (1943) (no expert testimony required to establish anxiety caused by blow to stomach while pregnant).
169. Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49 A.2d 81 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.
1946) (no evidence of more than transitory mental stress); Atlantic Coast Line
By. v. Brash, 73 Fla. 478, 74 So. 503 (1917) (insufficient evidence of neurosis);
Gremillion v. C. & L. Constr. Co., 125 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 1960) (insufficient
evidence of mental stress); Vachon v. Todorovich, 856 Mich. 182, 97 N.W.2d 122
(1959) (insufficient evidence of nervous condition); Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac
Co., 339 Mo. 711, 98 S.W.2d 969 (1936) (no evidence of mental unsoundness);
Cushing Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Francis, 206 Okla. 553, 245 P.2d 84 (1952)
(insufficient evidence of phobia).
170. Clegg v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 264 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1959). In this
unique case, the plaintiff was a spectator when a truck crashed into a filling station. Fire and widespread destruction ensued. The plaintiff realized the need
for rescue, but was overwhelmed by fear. His realization that he was not the omnipotent, fearless man his ego had envisioned him to be, caused great emotional
stress with residual mental and physical manifestations. So great was his emotional distress that in an attempt to recapture his lost self-esteem he engineered
highly successful business deals, became president of a large concern, and was
elected to the Baton Rouge City Councill The issue for the jury-was he damaged? Verdict for the defendant. See also Nelson v. Black, 43 Cal. 2d 612, 275
P.2d 473 (1954) (traumatic neurosis alleged-verdict for defendant); Dziuk v.
Loehrer, 123 N.V.2d 86 (Minn. 1983) (phobia alleged-nominal damages); Simos v. Kidd, 73 S.D. 306, 42 N.W.2d 307 (1950) (mental anguish allegedverdict for defendant).
171. E.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d
282 (1952) ($2,250 for fright and nausea remitted); Duncan v. Martin's Restaurant, 347 M11.
App. 183, 106 N.E.2d 731 (1952) ($1,500 for mental anguish remitted); Cumett v. Wolf, 244 Iowa 683, 57 N.W.2d 915 (1953) ($3,500 for mental
stress remitted); William Small & Co. v. Lonergan, 81 Kan. 48, 105 Pac. 27
(1909) ($1,000 for insult remitted); Humphreys v. Bennett Oil Corp., 195 La.
531, 197 So. 222 (1940) ($14,000 for mental suffering remitted); Kurpgeweit v.
Kirby, 88 Neb. 72, 129 N.W. 177 (1910) ($1,500 for mental anguish and nery-
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As one court has recognized, if awards for mentally induced injury are
limited to reasonable amounts, this alone will discourage excessive
72
litigation.'
As is true of duty and causation, standard tort doctrines concerning damages can be used appropriately to limit legal liability for an invasion of the right to mental security. With so many weapons in the
judicial arsenal, surely there is no need for arbitrary rules precluding
recovery for mentally induced injuries simply because they are mentally induced. Standard tort doctrines provide adequate safeguards.
Special rules for mental injury are both unnecessary and unjust.
CONCLuSIoN

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the following conclusions
seem warranted:
(1) To a substantial degree, there exists a legally protected
right to mental security.
(2) Legal protection of the right is steadily expanding.
(3) Policy considerations dictate that an invasion of the right
to mental security should create legal liability.
(4) Legal liability for an invasion of the right to mental security can and should be appropriately limited by applying standard
tort doctrines regarding duty, causation, and damages.
Everything that has been said in this note has been summarized by
a far more able writer in exactly twenty five words. In a recent Pennsylvania case,' 78 a herd of cows escaped from their enclosure and
ventured forth into the world, escorted by a large and ferocious bull.
During the course of their travels, the bull spied and gave chase to an
elderly lady. Because of her peril, the lady suffered severe emotional
distress resulting in a heart attack and continuing illness. Pennsylvania has an impact requirement, and the court dismissed the action
because of the lack of impact. Justice Musmanno, in dissent, capsuled
this note when he wrote: 7 4

ousness remitted); Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960)
($4,000 for neurosis remitted); Colsher v. Tennessee Elec. Power Co., 19 Tenn.
App. 166, 84 S.W.2d 117 (1935) ($1,000 for nervousness remitted); Ware v.
Paxton, 352 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) ($5,000 for mental pain remitted);
Browning v. Slenderella Sys., 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959) ($650 for
humiliation remitted).
172. De Loach v. Lanier, 125 F. Supp. 12, 14 (N.D. Fla. 1954).
173. Bosely v. Andrews, 398 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
174. Id. at 194-95, 142 A.2d at 280.
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